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Abstract:  Local authorities in North Carolina, and subsequently in at least 23 other states, have 
enacted laws intending to reduce predatory and abusive lending.  While there is substantial 
variation in the laws, they typically extend the coverage of the Federal Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) by including home purchase and open-end mortgage credit, by 
lowering annual percentage rate (APR) and fees and points triggers, and by prohibiting or 
restricting the use of balloon payments and prepayment penalties. 
 
This paper provides a detailed summary of various local predatory lending laws that are 
effective as of the end of 2004. We also create an index that captures differences in the strength 
of the local laws along the two important dimensions of coverage and restrictions. In addition, 
our univariate results show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the observed market 
responses to the local laws.  
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Introduction 
The current mortgage market consists primarily of two segments – the prime market and the 
subprime market.  The prime market extends credit to the majority of households.  The 
subprime market extends more expensive credit to households who are less financially secure.  
Subprime mortgage lending tends to occur in low-income areas and those with minority 
populations.  The subprime market identifies a large menu of product and risk classifications.  
Each classification charges a different risk-based price (interest rate and fees) that are 
substantially higher than those charged in the prime market, typically varying from one to 
four percentage points above the prime mortgage interest rate.  As a result, those households 
for whom homeownership is most difficult incur higher costs.  This combination of higher 
costs and higher rates of failure has led to public policy concerns over fairness and 
accessibility of credit. 
 
As reflected in regulations generated under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA), Congress has determined that it is socially preferable to restrict some types of 
high-cost and high risk lending.  In addition, many states, cities, and counties have extended 
the restrictions on credit to an even broader class of mortgages.  These restrictions include 
limits on allowable prepayment penalties and balloon payments, prohibitions of joint 
financing of various insurance products (credit, life, unemployment, etc), and requirements 
that borrowers participate in loan counseling.    
 
By introducing geographically defined predatory lending laws policymakers have conducted a 
natural experiment with well defined control and treatment groups.  Since state boundaries 
reflect political and not economic regions, we can compare mortgage market conditions in 
states with a law in effect
1 (the treatment group) to those in neighboring states currently 
without a predatory lending law (the control group).  However, instead of examining whole 
states we focus on households that are geographically close to each other (border counties) 
and in similar labor markets (multi-state metropolitan and micropolitan areas).  Specifically, 
                                                 
1 Laws are first enacted by the local legislature and become effective typically at a later date.  It is not until the 
law becomes in effect that lenders are required to follow the new rules and restrictions. 
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using the treatment and control group framework we examine how local predatory lending 
laws affect subprime applications, originations, and rejection rates.  
 
In addition, we create an index to measure the strength of the local predatory lending laws.  
The index measures: (i) how broad or narrow coverage the mortgage market is covered and 
(ii) how much certain lending practices and mortgage types are restricted.   
 
Since predatory lending has been associated primarily with subprime lending, the next section 
will discuss the growth of subprime lending and help to distinguish it from prime lending.   In 
addition, a range of predatory lending laws will be described including HOEPA and local 
(state, county, and city) laws that were in effect at the end of 2004.   
The Growth of Subprime Lending 
Subprime lending represents an opportunity for the mortgage market to extend the possibility 
of home ownership beyond traditional barriers.  These barriers exist because the prime 
segment of the mortgage market uses lending standards (credit scores and documented 
employment history, income, and wealth, among other factors) to evaluate applicants.  
Applicants that are rejected or expect to be rejected can look to the more expensive subprime 
market.  In this fashion the subprime market completes the mortgage market and can be 
welfare enhancing (Chinloy and MacDonald, 2005) because it provides the opportunity of 
home ownership to a larger portion of the population.   
 
Despite only anecdotal evidence, predatory lending has been predominantly associated with 
subprime lending and not prime lending
2.  Therefore, the welfare benefit associated with 
increased access to credit is believed to have been reduced by some unscrupulous lending in 
the subprime mortgage market.   
 
Table 1 shows the substantial growth of the subprime market that has set the stage for 
predatory lending laws.   Inside Mortgage Finance (Inside Mortgage Finance, 2004) reports in 
the Mortgage Market Statistics Annual that subprime lending has grown from $65 billion to 
                                                 
2 See HUD-Treasury report and Federal Reserve HOEPA Final Rule (Federal Reserve, 2002) 
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$332 billion from 1995 through 2003.
3  In addition, during this period of rapid growth lenders 
in the subprime market have been consolidating.  For example, from 1995 through 2003 the 
top 25 originators have grown from a market share of 39 percent to 93 percent of the 
subprime market.  This rapid growth is at least part of the impetus behind the broadening of 
the HOEPA standards in 2002 and the introduction of local predatory lending laws. 
 
Another facet of the subprime market, beyond its recent growth, is that these mortgages cost 
more than prime mortgages.  Table 2 shows the average interest charged at origination for 
fixed-rate loans in the prime and subprime markets.  The interest rate shown does not include 
any estimated fees and points paid or other upfront costs wrapped into the mortgage.  
However, the price differential is substantial.  For example, the spread between prime and 
subprime was on average as high as 2.98 percentage points in 2000. 
 
To justify such high interest rates for subprime borrowers, lenders must experience much 
larger rates of termination -- particularly foreclosures -- than in the prime market.  Figure 1 
provides evidence using data from the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBAA) 
that subprime loans do in fact experience substantially higher rates of foreclosures than both 
prime mortgages and loans endorsed by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA).  The figure 
also provides at least indirect evidence that subprime loans did not perform very well during 
the recession beginning in March 2001.  In contrast, FHA loans were only moderately 
affected and prime loans seemed almost completely unaffected by the recession.  For 
example, at their peak less than one percent of prime loans were in foreclosure, compared to 
more than nine percent for subprime loans. 
 
If these MBAA data are representative of the subprime market, then low income and high 
minority locations, where subprime lending is most dominant, could have almost one out of 
ten homes in foreclosure during a recession.  This type of performance can help to justify the 
                                                 
3 These numbers are derived from type B&C loans.  B&C loans are loans with less than A or prime quality loans.  
See the Mortgage Markets Statistics Annual published by Inside Mortgage Finance for more details on loan 
classification schemes. 
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higher rates on subprime loans.
4  However, such a high level of failure also raises questions 
about what effect the foreclosures have on the other nine homes in locations heavily financed 
by subprime mortgages.  
  





Top 25 B&C 
Originations 
(Billions) 
1995 $65.0  $25.5 
1996 $96.8  $45.3 
1997 $124.5  $75.1 
1998 $150.0  $94.3 
1999 $160.0  $105.6 
2000 $138.0  $102.2 
2001 $173.3  $126.8 
2002 $213.0  $187.6 
2003 $332.0  $310.1 
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance 2004 Annual Data Book.  B&C is 
defined as including loans with less than A quality non-agency paper 
secured by real estate.  Individual firm data are from Inside B&C 
Lending, which is another publication of Inside Mortgage Finance, and 
are generally based on security issuance or previously reported data. 
 
                                                 
4 In addition, these loans may be unaffordable and subject to high rates of foreclosure because of predatory 
interest rates and fees and not borrower or property characteristics. 
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Table 2: The Cost of Credit – Fixed Rate Origination Interest rate  
Year Subprime  Prime 
1995 9.77  7.65 
1996 9.78  7.64 
1997 9.73  7.38 
1998 9.26  6.83 
1999 10.05  7.31 
2000 10.92  7.95 
2001 9.50  6.84 
2002 8.38  6.35 
2003 7.25  5.69 
2004 7.13  5.79 
Source: Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market 
Survey for Prime loans and author’s calculations 
using LoanPerformance ABS data set for Subprime 


























Source: Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Fixed Rate Mortgages Only
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Understanding Predatory Lending 
In any document discussing predatory lending one of the first statements is usually similar to 
that found in the HUD-Treasury report (2000, p.17): “Defining the practices that make a loan 
predatory, however, is problematic.”  This difficulty arises because predatory lending depends 
on the inability of the borrower to understand the loan terms and the obligations associated 
with them.  For example, some borrowers may be willing to accept a prepayment penalty in 
exchange for lower interest rates or fees because they do not expect to move in the near 
future.  Or, the borrower may plan to diversify her portfolio away from a home and therefore 
would like an interest-only loan with a balloon payment in ten years.  But interviews held by 
HUD, Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board indicate that some, perhaps many, borrowers 
using high-cost loans may not have understood that the loan had a prepayment penalty or did 
not amortize through time, leading to a balloon payment.   
 
The fact that some borrowers lack this information or knowledge for such a significant debt 
may be hard to comprehend at first blush.  However, when a borrower buys a home or 
refinances a mortgage, a large and intimidating stack of documents is placed in front of her 
with little time to read, let alone digest, all of the text.  If borrowers actually read all the 
documents required by law at the time of closing it would take all day.  Moreover, many of 
the documents are written in a manner that is difficult for non-lawyers to understand.  For all 
practical purposes, the seller, buyer, and/or refinancer rely on the representations and 
interpretations of closing agents. 
 
Thus, it may be unreasonable to expect borrowers to actually read all the documents that 
define their rights and obligations. This makes it possible for unscrupulous agents to take 
advantage of that information gap.  Such abuses are more likely when the borrower is 
perceived as vulnerable because of age, economic circumstances, education, or disability. 
 
HUD-Treasury Report 
HUD and Treasury published an influential report in 2000 entitled “Curbing Predatory Home 
Mortgage Lending”.  The joint report provides policy suggestions for Congress, the Board of 
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Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Housing Authority on how to curb 
predatory lending. 
 
HUD and Treasury created a task force to solicit information from industry and community 
representatives in five locations (Atlanta, Los Angeles, New York, Baltimore, and Chicago).  
The task force itself included representatives from consumer groups, industry trade 
associations representing lenders, brokers, and appraisers, local officials, and academics.  The 
outreach effort provided substantial evidence through individual testimony that predatory 
lending does exist in the mortgage market and tends to be concentrated in the subprime 
market segment.  The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) also found 
anecdotal evidence of predatory lending when holding a series of open meetings to hear 
individual testimony.  The Board of Governors found that the testimony was widespread 
enough to indicate the need for increasing the coverage of HOEPA.  Many of the changes 
made to HOEPA and the concepts discussed in the Final Rule
5 were articulated in the HUD-
Treasury report.   
 
The HUD-Treasury report defines predatory lending as that involving deception or fraud and 
aggressive sales tactics, which takes advantage of the borrower’s lack of understanding of 
basic rights and the terms of the mortgage.  The report also concluded that predatory lending 
tends to occur more frequently in the refinancing of existing mortgages than in home purchase 
loans and more frequently in locations with low income and minority households. 
 
Categories of Predatory Lending 
Lending abuses or predatory practices can be categorized into four groups: loan flipping, 
imposition of excessive fees and “packing”, lending without regard for ability to repay, and 
fraud.   
 
Loan flipping is characterized by borrowers repeatedly refinancing a loan in a short period of 
time.  With each refinance, high fees are wrapped into the new loan amount, reducing the 
                                                 
5 Federal Reserve System, 12 CFR Part 226, Regulation Z; Docket No. R-1090, Truth in Lending. 
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equity left in the home.  In some instances, the report found evidence that fees exceeded 
$5,000 or as much as ten percent of the loan amount.   
 
Fees were found to be very large at times.  Typically fees were added to the financed amount 
(wrapped) instead of being paid upfront.  Perhaps most importantly, the consumers often were 
not aware of the fees, which could be charged by many different sources, including the 
mortgage broker, home improvement contractor, lender, or other third parties.  In addition to 
normal closing fees
6, some of the borrowers were sold single-premium credit life insurance, 
which was included in the loan amount and not used in the calculation of the APR. 
 
The task force found evidence that some loans were originated under terms that the borrower 
would never be able to meet.  This problem was exacerbated when the lender did not try to 
verify income, which may have been falsified by a broker.  Examples were found of elderly 
households on fixed incomes where the new mortgage payment exceeded their income.  Once 
the borrower failed to make payments, the lender foreclosed on the property.  Clearly, this 
practice is profitable only when the amount of equity in the home exceeds the cost of 
foreclosure and the borrower does not exercise the option to sell the home and prepay the 
mortgage before foreclosure.   
 
Other examples of predatory behavior included fraudulent inflation of property values through 
doctored loan applications and settlement documents as well as appraisers and brokers 
conspiring to inflate prices above market rates. 
 
Based on these findings, the report recommended improved consumer literacy and 
disclosures, as well as prohibitions on loan flipping, lending without regard to ability to repay, 
and the sale of life credit insurance and other similar products.  The task force also 
recommended that potentially abusive terms and conditions such as balloon payments, 
prepayment penalties, excessive fees and points be restricted. 
                                                 
6 Typical closing fees include items that all real estate transactions must pay such as transfer taxes, appraisal 
fees, recording fees, title search fees, and other processing fees. 
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National Restrictions – Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
Congress enacted HOEPA (Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 21600) by amending the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA, 15 U.S.C 1601).  In 1994, the Board of Governors implemented HOEPA 
through 12 CFR part 226 (Regulation Z), which articulates specific rules governing lending 
practices.   
 
HOEPA and the regulations promulgated under it define a class of loans that are given special 
consideration because they are more likely to have predatory features and require additional 
disclosures. HOEPA-covered loans (loans where HOEPA applies) include only closed-end 
home equity loans that meet APR and finance fee triggers. Home purchase loans and other 
types of lending backed by a home, such as lines of credit, are not covered by HOEPA.  
 
TILA requires the lender or creditor to disclose information about the terms and cost of 
consumer credit.  For example, TILA requires that the cost of credit in dollar amounts 
(finance charge) and the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) be disclosed to the consumer.  TILA 
provides uniformity in disclosures intended to make it easier for consumers to compare 
alternative credit sources.  For loans secured by a home, the creditor is also required to 
provide some additional disclosures and the consumer has the right to rescind some 
transactions.   
 
There are two versions of HOEPA.  The original version, in 1994, set out the framework and 
defined the triggers and restrictions.  The second version, in 2002, adjusted some of the 
triggers and restricted some additional practices. 
 
Original Triggers, Disclosures, and Restrictions 
In the 1994 version of Regulation Z, trigger APR and finance charges were used to identify a 
class of high-cost loans subject to HOEPA protections that went beyond TILA disclosures.  
HOEPA protections were triggered in one of two ways: (i) if the loan’s APR exceeded the 
rate for Treasury securities of comparable maturity by ten percentage points or more or (ii) if 
finance charges, including points and fees, were greater than eight percent of the loan amount 
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or 400 dollars, whichever was smaller.  The dollar amount was indexed to the consumer price 
index and rose to 480 dollars by 2002. 
 
A creditor offering a HOEPA-covered loan was required to provide the consumer a shortened 
disclosure statement at least three days before the closing date.  The creditor was also required 
to inform the consumer that they were not obligated to complete the transaction and that they 
could lose the home if they failed to make the mortgage payments. 
 
For HOEPA-covered loans, creditors were not allowed to provide short-term balloon notes, 
impose prepayment penalties greater than five years, use non-amortizing schedules, refinance 
loans into another HOEPA loan in the first 12 months, and impose higher interest rate upon 
default.  These restrictions implied that regulators considered these loan types and practices to 
be abusive lending practices when combined with high-cost loans.  In addition, creditors were 
not allowed to habitually engage in lending that did not take into account the ability of the 
consumer to repay the loan.  Again, this restriction implied that regulators believed such a 
pattern of lending, based strictly on the value of the property (or asset-based lending) is not 
conducive to homeownership and inconsistent with public policy promoting homeownership. 
 
2002 Changes in Triggers, Disclosures, and Restrictions 
Since 1994, subprime lending has grown very rapidly and has led to concerns that predatory 
lending was occurring even while complying with the requirements set forth in Regulation Z.  
Various initiatives were undertaken in the early 2000s to further define and regulate 
potentially predatory lending.  During 2000 and 2001, hearings were held by the Senate 
Banking Committee, the House Banking Committee, and HUD-Treasury.  Also in 2000 the 
Board of Governors held hearings on predatory lending to discuss potential changes to 
Regulation Z, which was amended effective October 1, 2002. 
 
The 2002 amendments, which are still in effect today, adjusted the triggers, restricted some 
additional lending practices, adjusted the ability to pay requirements, and increased disclosure 
requirements.  The APR trigger for first-lien loans was reduced to eight percentage points, 
while the trigger for second lien loans (subordinate loans) was left at ten percentage points.   
  11 
The fee trigger was expanded to include dollars paid at closing for optional insurance 
programs, such as credit life, accident, health, loss of income, and other debt protection 
programs.  Regulations prohibited loans with call provisions and loans where the creditor had 
not verified or documented the consumer’s ability to pay the mortgage.  Therefore, no-
documentation loans that met these triggers were expressly prohibited.  However, HOEPA 
still covers only refinance and second mortgages, not for-purchase mortgages, lines of credit, 
or other open-end credit. 
 
There is little information available to calculate what fraction of the mortgage market includes 
loans covered by HOEPA in the 1994 and 2002 regulations.  In Regulation Z (Federal 
Reserve, 2002) or the Final Rule some information is provided using data from other 
institutions about the prevalence of HOEPA loans.  For example, data analyzed by the Office 
of Thrift and Supervision showed that lowering the APR trigger from ten to eight percentage 
points may expand HOEPA-coverage by one to five percentage points for first lien 
mortgages.  The data used to do the analysis was obtained from the Mortgage Information 
Corporation, which is current called LoanPerformance.  Following the methodology and using 
the same data source we test to see what percentage of subprime loans the 2002 regulations 
would have covered from 1996 through 2001.  We found that by applying the interest rate at 
origination as if it were the APR 1.94 percent of the subprime loans would be covered by 
2002 HOEPA.
7 This number should be biased down because it does not include any 
estimation of fees and points. This data set does provide extensive information about loan 
types, but does not provide any information about the APR or fees paid by borrowers.  This 
makes any analysis of HOEPA-coverage difficult and only a proxy for the true coverage.  A 
trade association representing nine nondepository subprime lenders also provided detailed 
data, indicating that the 1994 APR trigger had covered approximately nine percent of first 
liens and the 2002 APR trigger would cover, if in effect, approximately 26 percent of first 
liens. 
                                                 
7 The estimated 1.94 percent coverage rate was calculated for all loans in the LoanPerformance ABS database 
without local (state, county, or city) predatory lending laws in effect.  To help account for any reactions leading 
up to the date of the law’s enactment, the analysis does not include loans made in the six-month period before 
the 2002 regulations went into effect.  In addition, using the same methodology we calculated the percent of 
loans covered by HOEPA after the regulation were in effect until the end of 2004.  These results indicate that 
after the law went into effect only 0.01 percent of loans were covered. 
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Regional Restrictions – State and Local Predatory Lending Laws 
A number of states and local municipalities have sought to impose restrictions on predatory 
lending that reach further than HOEPA and Regulation Z. Appendix A summarizes the 
characteristic for a sample of state and local laws that were in effect as of the end of 2004.
8
 
As shown in Appendix B, which indicates the status of county and city predatory lending 
bills, local efforts to enact restrictions have met with little success.  Rather, local laws have 
been subject to ongoing and frequently successful legal challenges, vetoes, and preemption by 
state and local laws.  As of the end of 2004, our sample includes very few local municipalities 
– including Chicago, Cleveland, Cook County, and the District of Columbia – with an 
ordinance in effect. 
 
Statewide efforts have been far more successful.  Beginning with North Carolina in 1999, at 
least 24 states have passed predatory lending laws that are currently in effect: including 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.   
 
Both the original and the 2002 versions of HOEPA defined a class of high-cost refinance 
mortgages that were subject to special restrictions.  The state laws tend to follow this lead and 
expand the definition of covered loans.  For example, North Carolina – the first state to enact 
predatory lending restrictions -- includes both closed-end and open-end mortgages but not 
reverse mortgages and limits loan size to the conventional conforming limit (loans small 
enough to be purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and therefore not considered part of 
the jumbo market). HOEPA covers only those closed-end loans that are not for home 
purchase (typically refinance and second mortgages). North Carolina did leave the APR 
triggers the same as the HOEPA triggers, although the points and fees triggers were reduced 
                                                 
8 Every attempt was made to include all laws in effect by the end of 2004 that, similar to HOEPA, use triggers to 
define a class of loans eligible for restrictions and disclosures.  Because other laws are likely to exist those 
discussed here should be viewed as a sample of the all state and local predatory lending laws. Appendix C 
provides a summary of lending laws that are not focused on high-cost or subprime lending and do not have any 
triggers. 
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from the HOEPA eight percent of total loan amount to five percent for loans under $20,000. 
For loans $20,000 or larger, the same eight percent trigger is used or $1,000, whichever is 
smaller. The North Carolina law also prohibits prepayment penalties and balloon payments 
for most covered loans. But the law also prohibits the financing of credit life, disability, 
unemployment, or other life and insurance premiums, while HOEPA included them only as 
part of the trigger calculation.  
 
Appendix A shows that while most states followed the North Carolina example there is some 
variation in laws.  For example, Georgia passed a law that became effective in October 2002 
(amended in March 2003) that also includes open-end credit but sets slightly different APR 
trigger levels to define high-cost loans and covered loans.  The points and fees triggers then 
differ depending on whether the loan is categorized as high-cost or simply covered.  
Prepayment penalties are also prohibited during the first 12 months of the loan if they exceed 
two percent of the value of the loan or during the second 12 months they exceed one percent.  
In this case, Georgia prepayment safeguards are weaker than North Carolina’s. 
 
In an attempt to quantify the differences in the local laws an index is created.  The higher the 
index the stronger the law is.  In addition, the index can be broken down into two 
components.  The first is the extent that the law has extended coverage of the law beyond the 
HOEPA.  The second is the extent that the law restricts or requires specific practices.  Table 3 
summarizes how the law index is created.  The full index reflects all the assigned points as 
defined in Table 3, while the coverage and restrictions indexes reflect the sum of all points 
assigned in each subcategory. 
 
The coverage category includes measures of loan purpose, APR 1
st lien, APR higher liens, 
and points and fees.  In general, if the law does not increase the coverage it is assigned zero 
points.  Higher points are assigned if the coverage is more general.  The highest point total for 
extending the loan purpose coverage is when the law covers all loans.  The points assigned for 
extending the APR triggers is defined as the difference between the HOEPA trigger and the 
laws trigger.  In addition, laws with no APR triggers are assigned the maximum observed 
difference plus one.  The point and fees trigger points also follow a similar approach.  Laws 
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that extend HOEPA in any way are assigned one point, other laws are assigned the difference 
between the HOEPA percent points and fees trigger and the minimum trigger used in the law 
minus one.  Laws with no points and fees triggers are assigned four points. 
   
The restrictions index includes measures of prepayment penalty restrictions, balloon 
restrictions, counseling requirements, and restrictions on mandatory arbitration.  If the law 
does not require any restriction or requirement then zero points are assigned.  Higher points 
indicate more restrictions.  For example, laws that do not restrict prepayment penalties are 
assigned zero points, while laws that prohibit all prepayment penalties are assigned four 
points.  Laws that prohibit or restrict the points more quickly are assigned higher points.  For 
balloon restriction, the points vary from zero for no restrictions to four when the law prohibits 
all balloons.
9   The last two restrictions measure whether the law requires counseling before 
the loan is originated or restricts fully or partially mandatory arbitration clauses.  
 
Table 4 reports the calculated full or law index, the coverage index, and the restrictions index 
for each law included in the appendix.  The average law index is 10.16 varying from 4 in 
Florida, Maine, and Nevada to 17 in New Mexico and Cleveland.  The coverage index and the 
restrictions index have a mean just over 5.  The coverage and restrictions indexes are only 
modestly correlated at 0.19.  This indicates that while laws that increase coverage more also 
tend to increase the restrictions more the relationship is very noisy.  Therefore, there are laws 
that increase coverage without increasing restrictions (Nevada) and other states that extend 
restrictions more than coverage (Florida and Georgia, for example). 
 
In summary, the state and local laws tend to expand the coverage of HOEPA by either 
expanding the triggers and/or including home purchase and open-end credit.  Prepayment 
penalties can also be prohibited early in a loan’s life and can be limited in size.  Balloon 
payments can also be limited in size or prohibited early in the life of a loan.  The packing of 
credit life or other insurance premiums into the mortgage is also typically restricted or 
prohibited.   
                                                 
9 The law in Cleveland was determined to be restrictive and was assigned four points despite not neatly falling 
into any of the categories. 
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Table 3: Law Index Definition 
Category  Description of Law Index 
Coverage:    
 
Loan Purpose  
HOEPA equivalent=0,  
all loans except no government loans=1,  
all loans except no reverse-open loans=2,  
all loans except no reverse, business, or construction loans =3,and  
all loans with no exceptions=4 
 
APR Trigger 1st Lien 
HOEPA equivalent =0,  
(HOEPA Trigger) –Trigger, and 
no trigger=max+1=3 
 
APR Trigger Higher Liens 
HOEPA equivalent =0,  
(HOEPA Trigger) –Trigger, and 
no trigger=max+1=4 
 
Points and Fees Trigger 
HOEPA equivalent =0,  
any extension=1,  
HOEPA%-min%-1, and  
no trigger=4 
Restrictions:   
Prepayment Penalty 
Prohibitions 
No restriction=0,  
prohibition or percent limits after 60 months=1,  
prohibition or percent limits after 36 months=2,  
prohibition or percent limits after 24 months=3, and 
no penalties allowed=4 
Balloon Prohibitions 
No restriction =0,  
no balloon if term<7 years (all term restrictions) =1,  
no balloon in first 10 years of mortgage =2,  
no balloon in first 10 years of mortgage and Cleveland=3, and 
no balloons allowed=4 
Counseling Requirements  Not required=0, and 
Required=1 
Mandatory Arbitration 
Limiting Judicial Relief 
Allowed=0,  
partially restricted=1, and  
prohibited =2 
The law index is calculated by summing all categories.  The coverage and restrictions indexes 
are created by summing the subcategories. 
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Arkansas 8  5  3 
California 11  7  4 
Chicago, IL  15  10  5 
Cleveland, OH  17  7  10 
Colorado 13  8  5 
Connecticut 10  5  5 
Cook County, IL  15  10  5 
Florida 4  0  4 
Georgia 16  6  10 
Illinois 13  6  7 
Indiana 11  4  7 
Kentucky 9  2  7 
Maine 4  4  0 
Maryland 8  7  1 
Massachusetts 14  6  8 
Nevada 4  4  0 
New Jersey  10.5  5.5  5 
New Mexico  17  7  10 
New York  10  6  4 
North Carolina  11  3  8 
Ohio 6  4  2 
Oklahoma 8  2  6 
Pennsylvania 7  4  3 
South Carolina  9  4  5 
Texas 8  2  6 
Utah 6  4  2 
Washington,DC 15 8  7 
Wisconsin 5  3  2 
Average 10.16  5.13  5.04 
Standard Deviation  4.03  2.39  2.82 
The Coverage and Restrictions Indexes are modestly correlated (0.19). 
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Some Potential Impacts of the Restrictions 
HOEPA and the state and local laws are designed to eliminate certain classes of loans from 
being originated.  These prohibitions implicitly assume that the terms of these loans are 
inherently abusive or that the fraction of loans that are abusive is so high that the social 
benefit of avoiding the abusive loans outweighs the social cost of restricting access to credit 
by high-risk applicants.  This section discusses some of the laws’ potential impacts.  Some 
examples include: (i) whether the laws influence the supply of credit in general, (ii) whether 
the laws impact the prevalence of specific types of loans targeted by the laws, (iii) whether a 
reaction occurs in the market by substituting different uncovered loans for covered loans as 
opposed to reducing the supply of credit, (iv) whether the secondary market reacts by 
reducing liquidity, and (v) whether regulatory costs (the cost of complying with the local 
predatory lending laws) are passed on to consumers through higher interest rates.  The 
following section reviews the to-date evidence on the impact of predatory lending laws.  
 
Supply of Credit 
Unfortunately, no research to date (to our knowledge) has measured the costs and benefits to 
society of HOEPA and the state and local predatory lending laws.  Instead, researchers are 
able to measure how the volume of loans has reacted to the introduction of the law.  This 
analysis helps to answer the first question: Do predatory lending laws reduce the supply of 
credit?  There is substantial evidence that the North Carolina predatory lending law is binding 
(Ernst, Farris, and Stein 2002; Quercia, Stegman, and Davis 2003; Harvey and Nigro 2004; 
and Elliehausen and Staten 2004) and some initial evidence that the laws passed in Chicago 
and Philadelphia also had an impact (Harvey and Nigro 2003).   
 
The primary finding of the research to date is that the volume of subprime loans did decrease 
in North Carolina.  The impact seems to be larger for low-income borrowers and minority 
borrowers.  There is also some evidence that the decline in volume came from reduced 
applications -- not increases in rejection rates.  Given that predatory lending laws have spread 
to many other localities it remains to be seen whether this result continues to hold. 
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Targeted Loan Types 
A second question is to determine whether there is evidence that the types of loans targeted by 
these laws, or loan-related characteristics such as balloon payments and prepayment penalties, 
are affected when the law becomes effective.  Quercia, Stegman, and Davis (2003) show that 
balloon payment loans and prepayment penalties tended to become a smaller portion of the 
market after the law in North Carolina was introduced.    
 
Substitution 
The finding that the predatory lending law in North Carolina resulted in fewer subprime loans 
and fewer of the targeted loan types suggests that lenders are not able to find perfect 
substitutes for the prohibited loan types.  For example, if the prohibited loans were predatory 
because they charged excessive fees and interest rates, one response of predatory lenders to 
the laws would be to simply charge lower fees and interest rates.  In essence, the lenders 
would become less predatory.  On the other hand, if the market is perfectly competitive then 
the laws should simply restrict the flow of credit.
10   
 
In perfect risk-based pricing, each borrower is charged a unique price associated with their 
estimated risk profile.  In a perfectly competitive market, each loan is priced at the break-even 
rate.  Therefore, lenders cannot reduce the price charged to the high-risk borrowers because 
the loan would lose money.  As a result, loans with risk characteristics that require a break-
even price above the legal limit will no longer be originated.  This outcome is consistent with 
the findings in North Carolina that the volume of loans decreased when the law became 
effective.   
 
By contrast, if lenders operate in an environment where perfect competition is not achieved – 
such as a case in which the borrower does not understand the terms of the loan -- the price 
charged to the consumer for these loans could be higher than the cost.  In these circumstances, 
it is possible for lenders to charge above the break-even price and impose abusive or 
                                                 
10 Another option is that the reduced flow of credit in the subprime market is matched by an increased flow of 
credit in the prime market; that is, prime loans are being substituted for subprime loans.  Research in North 
Carolina has found no evidence of this type of substitution (Ernst, Farris, and Stein 2002, Quercia, Stegman, and 
Davis 2003, Harvey and Nigro 2004, and Elliehausen and Staten 2004).  
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predatory lending rates.  As a result, lenders will be able to reduce the price and still break 
even on at least some of the prohibited loans.  This would be the simplest form of substitution 
available to lenders in response to legal restrictions and would be consistent with the notion 
that abusive and predatory lending has been occurring. 
 
Other forms of substitution are also possible.  Lenders may also try to move potential 
borrowers away from covered loans and toward other types of loans with similar payment 
characteristics that are not covered by the law.  For example, the laws do not distinguish 
between adjustable rate and fixed rate loans.  Adjustable rate loans typically have lower 
interest rates at origination than fixed rate loans, but over time the interest rate will adjust to a 
fixed spread above predetermined interest rate instruments such as LIBOR or Treasury bill 
rates.  Therefore, lenders could be expected to shift some borrowers away from fixed rate 
loans and into adjustable rate loans to avoid violating the predatory laws or having the loan 
covered by the law.  Such substitution from one product type to another does not necessarily 
mean abusive loans are being made, because it can also be consistent with break-even pricing.   
 
Liquidity 
The regulations may make it more difficult to sell loans in the secondary market.  Firms such 
as Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, which rate private label securities, have refused to rate 
securities covered by some of the local lending laws.  For example, Standard & Poor’s 
required that loans covered by the original Georgia law (October 2002) not be included in any 
securities because they interpreted the law as imposing potentially uncapped and unlimited 
liability on holders of securities that contain predatory loans.  Georgia later amended the law 
so that the exposure was limited to all remaining indebtedness of the borrower plus attorney 
fees and costs.  Standard and Poor’s also reports an indicator of loss severity associated with 
the securities.  This number is reported in Appendix A for each law for which it is available.  
For example, the loss severity number for Georgia is 110 percent: This is the estimate of the 
total possible damages required to extinguish the liability under the loan, assuming a nine 
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percent coupon rate on a 30-year loan of 100,000 dollars, including attorney fees and costs, 
which are assumed to be ten percent of the unpaid balance.
11       
Predatory Lending Laws and the Flow of Credit 
This section examines potential impacts of the laws on the volume of lending.  If volume is 
unaffected, then the flow of and the supply of credit to potential consumers has not been 
affected in the aggregate.  This method generally follows Harvey and Nigro (2004) research 
on the North Carolina predatory lending law.  In particular, we extend prior research by 
examining the impacts in a variety of locations and seeing if the North Carolina experience is 
representative or typical for other states. 
 
In each state we examine the change in originations for subprime loans under the prescribed 
loan limits in the year before the predatory lending law is introduced and the year after the 
law is introduced using the publicly available Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
data.
12  Growth rates are calculated for loans associated with a list of subprime lenders as 
identified by the HUD subprime lender list.
13  In an attempt to create as similar comparison 
groups as possible, only counties that border other states without a local predatory lending law 
are used for the treatment group.  The control group only includes counties in neighboring 
states that border the treatment state and do not have a predatory lending law in effect during 
the observed time period (the year before and after the introduction of the predatory lending 
law).  This contrasts with other studies (Harvey and Nigro 2004; Elliehausen and Staten 2004) 
that have used whole neighboring states or regions to define both control and treatment 
groups.  Our approach should help to increase the comparability of the treatment group and 
the control group because they are geographically closer and, as a result, likely to be more 
economically similar than full state and region comparisons. 
                                                 
11 See the Standard and Poor’s web site and the May 14, 2004, presentation by Frank Raiter, entitled “Evaluating 
Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: S&P’s Approach”.  The MBAA also reprints the S&P reports on each local 
lending law for its association members, available at www.mbaa.org. 
12 The results are very similar if the loan limits are not applied to reduce the sample. 
13 http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html, accessed on 2/1/05. HUD generates a list of subprime lenders 
from industry trade publications, HMDA data analysis, and phone calls to the lender confirm the extent of 
subprime lending.  Since this list is defined at the lender level loans made by the subprime lender may include 
both prime and subprime loans.  In addition, subprime loans made by predominately prime lenders will also be 
incorrectly identified as prime lending.  Therefore, an alternative interpretation of the loans identified using the 
HUD subprime lender list is that it identifies the extent of specialized subprime lending not full-service lending.  
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This approach and HMDA availability reduces the sample to ten state local predatory lending 
laws (California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas). 
 
Table 5 reports the percent change in originated loans.  Using North Carolina as an example, 
the results show that subprime originations decreased by 35.8 percent in the treatment 
counties from 1999 through 2001 while subprime originations decreased by 18.9 percent in 
the control counties.  In other words, consistent with prior research on the North Carolina 
predatory lending law subprime originations decreased substantially more than would be 
expected given the performance of the control counties.  This finding is also found in four 
other states – Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Ohio.  However, in five states – 
California, Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Texas – the results indicate that 
subprime originations increased more in the treatment locations.
14  These results indicate that 
the experience in North Carolina may not extend to all other predatory lending laws and that 
there may be sufficient variation in the laws that some may increase or decrease the flow of 
credit. 
 
The second and third columns examine the relative growth rates in originations for minority 
and low income applicants.
15  Again, the results are mixed as some locations experienced a 
relative increase and others a relative decrease in subprime originations.   
 
Table 6 examines the relative growth in applications for subprime credit and Table 7 
examines the relative change in subprime rejection rates.  Again the application results are 
mixed and very similar to the origination results.  For example, four state laws experienced a 
relative increase in applications and six state laws experienced a relative decrease in 
                                                 
14 The Texas sample consists of counties on the Texas-Louisiana border. Since all sampled Texan counties 
(Harrison, Marion, Newton, Orange, Panola, Sabine, Shelby) are rural, few subprime lenders were identified in 
the data and hence the number of subprime loans might be deceptively small, especially in 2000. This might 
explain the unusually large percentage increases in application and origination for Texas. 
15 Low-income is defined to include household income less than or equal to 80 percent of the county median 
household income as reported in the 2000 Census. Minority category includes black and Hispanic applicants as 
reported in HMDA. 
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applications.  However the rejection rates tell a much more consistent story.  In most states, 
rejection rates declined more in the treatment locations than in the control locations indicating 
that the introduction of predatory lending laws was associated with a disproportionate 
reduction in the rate that subprime application were rejected.   
 
These results do not provide any indication that predatory lending laws systematically reduce 
the flow of subprime credit.  However, the results do show that predatory lending laws tend to 
be associated with lower rejection rates of subprime mortgage applications.  It can be 
expensive just to apply for a mortgage: the non-refundable application fee usually runs from 
$200 to $300, not to mention other hidden or non-pecuniary costs. Thus, while reducing 
rejection rates may not have been the primary purpose of the laws, a reduction in rejections 
can be a substantial savings to consumers. 
 
Correlation of Impact and Law Indexes 
The previous section followed prior literature and estimated the impact of a local lending law 
one law at a time. While the findings for North Carolina law sample were largely replicated 
the results showed that other laws did not always have the same impact.  In fact, some laws 
were associated with relative increases in the flow of credit.  This section tests to see if the 
heterogeneity in market responses is related to the nature or strength of the local law.   
 
Table 8 presents the correlation between the impact of a local law, measured as the difference 
in the percent change in the probability of the outcome (applying, originating, or being 
rejected), and the law indexes described previously.  Stronger laws are correlated with relative 
reductions in application, origination, and rejection rates.  However, law coverage is 
positively correlated with application, origination, and rejection rates and law restrictions are 
negatively associated with application, origination, and rejection rates and law restrictions.  
This provides preliminary evidence that the design of a local predatory lending law can lead 
to different outcomes in terms of the flow of credit (origination rates), the demand for credit 
(application rates), and the rejections of subprime applications (rejection rates). 
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Table 5: Pre/Post Law Percent Change in Originations 
   All Loans  Minority  Low-income 
California 2001-2003      
  California  177.3  344.7  148.7 
  Control group  53.1  71.1  17.8 
  Difference  124.2  273.6  130.9 
Connecticut 2000-2002      
  Connecticut  87.8  127.7  67.9 
  Control group  80.6  107.3  28.2 
  Difference  7.2  20.3  39.7 
Florida 2001-2003      
  Florida  55.5  101.0  8.8 
  Control group  59.9  125.2  2.3 
  Difference  -4.3  -24.3  6.5 
Georgia 2001-2003      
  Georgia  18.9  87.5  -14.0 
  Control group  46.2  108.1  29.6 
  Difference  -27.3  -20.6  -43.6 
Maryland 2001-2003      
  Maryland  129.4  256.5  140.6 
  Control group  57.6  165.4  84.6 
  Difference  71.8  91.0  55.9 
Massachusetts 2000-2002      
  Massachusetts  56.4  134.8  17.1 
  Control group  69.6  107.4  8.2 
  Difference  -13.2  27.4  8.9 
North Carolina 1999-2001      
  North Carolina  -35.8  -35.7  -50.2 
  Control group  -18.9  -30.1  -31.6 
  Difference  -16.9  -5.6  -18.5 
Ohio 2001-2003      
  Ohio  3.2  4.2  -23.3 
  Control group  8.4  47.0  4.0 
  Difference  -5.3  -42.8  -27.3 
Pennsylvania 2000-2002      
  Pennsylvania  -5.8  -48.4  -38.0 
  Control group  -30.7  -59.1  -45.9 
  Difference  24.9  10.7  7.9 
Texas 2000-2002      
  Texas  3069.2  ---  --- 
  Control group  -12.6  -53.0  -46.3 
  Difference  3,081.8  ---  --- 
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Table 6: Pre/Post Law Percent Change in Applications 
   All Loans  Minority  Low-income 
California 2001-2003      
  California  110.0  268.1  81.3 
  Control group  43.3  123.4  31.5 
  Difference  66.7  144.6  49.8 
Connecticut 2000-2002      
  Connecticut  43.4  51.9  29.1 
  Control group  59.8  34.7  35.4 
  Difference  -16.4  17.2  -6.3 
Florida 2001-2003      
  Florida  21.0  137.4  3.3 
  Control group  76.0  156.3  23.4 
  Difference  -55.0  -18.9  -20.1 
Georgia 2001-2003      
  Georgia  -16.2  72.1  -29.8 
  Control group  27.7  116.4  7.4 
  Difference  -43.9  -44.3  -37.2 
Maryland 2001-2003      
  Maryland  77.2  258.7  71.0 
  Control group  33.3  238.5  32.7 
  Difference  44.0  20.1  38.4 
Massachusetts 2000-2002      
  Massachusetts  45.4  84.1  24.1 
  Control group  60.2  42.7  36.2 
  Difference  -14.8  41.4  -12.1 
North Carolina 1999-2001      
  North Carolina  -25.9  -37.9  -35.7 
  Control group  16.1  -28.3  3.3 
  Difference  -42.0  -9.6  -39.0 
Ohio 2001-2003      
  Ohio  -9.5  7.0  -27.5 
  Control group  -2.8  52.8  -15.1 
  Difference  -6.6  -45.7  -12.5 
Pennsylvania 2000-2002      
  Pennsylvania  11.0  -42.8  -1.2 
  Control group  -12.5  -57.3  -11.3 
  Difference  23.5  14.5  10.1 
Texas 2000-2002      
  Texas  5480.0  ---  6014.3 
  Control group  -12.2  -53.6  -31.8 
  Difference  5,492.2  ---  6,046.1 
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Table 7: Pre/Post Law Percent Change in Rejection Rates 
   All Loans  Minority  Low-income 
California 2001-2003      
  California  -33.4  -26.1  -25.0 
  Control group  -13.3  10.9  -2.3 
  Difference  -20.0  -37.0  -22.7 
Connecticut 2000-2002      
  Connecticut  -19.5  -17.0  -13.6 
  Control group  -19.7  -23.7  2.2 
  Difference  0.2  6.7  -15.9 
Florida 2001-2003      
  Florida  -12.2  2.3  -3.5 
  Control group  2.8  1.9  -1.0 
  Difference  -15.0  0.4  -2.6 
Georgia 2001-2003      
  Georgia  -23.2  -13.0  -15.1 
  Control group  -8.3  1.1  -10.8 
  Difference  -14.9  -14.0  -4.3 
Maryland 2001-2003      
  Maryland  -25.7  -6.9  -21.9 
  Control group  -15.7  24.6  -20.5 
  Difference  -9.9  -31.5  -1.3 
Massachusetts 2000-2002      
  Massachusetts  -19.4  -25.5  -8.0 
  Control group  -13.6  -18.8  9.7 
  Difference  -5.7  -6.6  -17.7 
North Carolina 1999-2001      
  North Carolina  20.0  9.7  24.4 
  Control group  37.0  6.2  28.0 
  Difference  -17.0  3.5  -3.6 
Ohio 2001-2003      
  Ohio  -6.6  -1.2  -4.3 
  Control group  -2.0  -4.5  -5.8 
  Difference  -4.6  3.3  1.5 
Pennsylvania 2000-2002      
  Pennsylvania  2.4  7.0  18.6 
  Control group  3.4  1.6  16.8 
  Difference  -1.1  5.4  1.8 
Texas 2000-2002      
  Texas  72.7  ---  4.8 
  Control group  -9.8  -7.9  -2.2 
  Difference  82.5  ---  7.0 
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Table 8: Correlation of Impact and Law Indexes 
   Percent Deviation: 
   Originations Applications Rejections 
Law Index Type:  Full  -0.15 -0.09  -0.21 
 Coverage  0.50 0.66  0.04 
 Restrictions -0.55 -0.59  -0.29 
Percent deviation values from “differences” reported in tables 5-7 and law index values from 
table 4.
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Conclusion 
Starting with North Carolina in 1999, states and other localities across the U.S. have 
introduced legislation intended to curb predatory and abusive lending in the subprime 
mortgage market.  These laws usually extend the reach of the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act (HOEPA) by including home purchase and open-end mortgage credit, 
lowering annual percentage rate (APR) and fees and points triggers, and prohibiting and/or 
restricting the use of balloon payments and prepayment penalties on covered loans. 
 
This paper provides a summary of 28 state and local predatory lending laws that were passed 
and in effect by the end of 2004. Beyond this summary, we extend the current literature in 
several ways: (i) the impact of predatory lending laws in many other states in addition to 
North Carolina is examined, (ii) the data design compares loans, and loan applications, that 
are geographically close instead of whole states and regions, and (iii) indexes are created in an 
attempt to quantify differences in the strength of the local laws. 
 
Preliminary univariate results provide some evidence that each local predatory lending law 
impacts the flow of credit in a different way, and that the experience in North Carolina found 
in literature (reduced application and origination) is not typical. Future research should 
incorporate some measure of the strength of the laws, such as the indexes created in this 
paper, into empirical tests to understand the mechanism by which local predatory lending 
laws affect the subprime market.  
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Appendix A: Predatory Lending Laws – Provision Chart 
   Arkansas  California  Chicago, IL  Cleveland, OH 
Bill's title  HB 2598  AB 489  Predatory Lending Ordinance  Ordinance No. 737-02 
Effective date  7/16/2003  7/1/2002  8/30/2000  7/29/2002 
Coverage  A high-cost home loan includes an 
open-end credit plan but not a reverse 
mortgage, bridge or construction loan, 
where the total loan amount does not 
exceed $150,000. 
A covered loan includes a consumer 
credit transaction in which the principal 
balance does not exceed $250,000 (to 
be adjusted every five years). 
Apply to loans secured by residential 
real property. Does not include loans 
with total loan amount over $250,000. 
Apply to loans secured by residential 
real property in Cleveland. Predatory 
loans shall not include loan made 
primarily for business purpose. 
APR trigger (HOEPA: 
APR>T-bill + 8% for first 
lien; + 10% for second 
lien) *  
Like HOEPA  APR > T-bill + 8%  APR > T-bill + 6% (first lien) or 8% 
(second lien) 
APR>T-bill + 4.5% up to 8% for first 
lien, or + 6.5% up to 10% for junior lien. 
Points and fees trigger 
(HOEPA: P&F> greater 
of 8% of total loan 
amount or $499 (for 
2004) - the set dollar 
amount is adjusted 
annually according to 
CPI) 
P&F > 5% of the total loan amount for 
loans =/> $75,000; or 6% of the total 
loan amount for loans < $75,000 but > 
$20,000; or 8% of the total loan amount 
for loans =/< $20,000 
P&F >6% of the total loan 
amount 
P&F > (1) 5% of the total loan mount if 
amount >=$16,000, or (2) $800 if loan 
amount < $16,000. 
None defined 
Points and fees 
definition 
It includes, among others, all 
compensation paid directly or indirectly 
to a mortgage broker and the maximum 
prepayment penalties which may be 
charged or collected under the terms of 
the loan document but only if the 
prepayment penalties exceed 3% of 
the principal loan amount remaining on 
the date of prepayment, if the 
prepayment is made within the first 12 
months, 2% if the prepayment is made 
within the second 12 months, or 1% if 
the prepayment is made within the third 
12 months. Excludable: 2 BFDs if the 
loan rate is within 1% of 90-day 
Fannie/Freddie rate; 1BFD if within 2%. 
All upfront lender and broker 
compensation 
Include, among others, all 
compensation paid directly or indirectly 
to a mortgage broker, the premium of 
any single premium credit life, credit 
disability, credit unemployment, or any 
other life or health insurance. Shall not 
include taxes, filing fees, charges paid 
to public officials or government 
agency, bona fide and reasonable fees 
paid to third party. 
Include, among others, all 
compensation paid directly or indirectly 
to mortgage broker. Any fees for 
preparing loan-related documents, eg. 
Deeds, mortgages, and reconveyances 
or settlement documents shall be 
included in points and fees. 
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Continued --Appendix A: Predatory Lending Laws – Provision Chart 
   Arkansas  California  Chicago, IL  Cleveland, OH 
Prepayment penalties  Fees incorporated in the loan balance 
prohibited 
No prepayment penalty after the first 36 
months; penalty allowed within the first 
36 months only if: the consumer has 
been offered a choice of another 
product without prepayment penalty; 
the terms of penalty, rates, points, and 
fees are disclosed at least 3 days 
before consummation; prepayment 
penalty is limited to 6 months’ advance 
interest on the amount prepaid in any 
12 month period in excess of 20% of 
original principal balance; no penalty if 
the covered loan is accelerated due to 
default; no financing of penalty through 
a new loan originated by the same 
person. 
Prohibits prepayment penalities (1) that 
apply to a prepayment made after the 
expiration of 36-month period following 
the date the loan was made, or (2) that 
are more than 3% total loan amount 
(first 12 months) or 2% (second 12 
months) or 1% (third 12 month period).  
Prohibited 
Loan counseling  Required  Availability of counseling must be 
disclosed. 
No provision  Required 
Ability to repay  No lending without due regard to ability 
to pay 
Total monthly debt payments do not 
exceed 55% of monthly gross income. 
Monthly debts should not exceed 50% 
gross income. Applies to borrowers 
whose income is no greater than 120% 
of the Chicago MSA median family 
income. 
Presumed to be able to repay if total 
monthly debts do not exceed 50% 
monthly gross income and borrower 
has sufficient residual income to pay 
essential monthly expenses. 
Balloon payments  No provision  No balloons for loans with a term of 5 
years or less. 
No balloons payable less than 180 
months after consummation. 
Predatory loans will contain a 
scheduled payment that is more than 
twice as large as the average of earlier 
scheduled payments. Does not apply to 
loan less than one year. 
Assignee liability  S&P indicative loss severity 196%  No liability for an assignee that is a 
holder in due course, but violations of 
major protections render those terms 
unenforceable   
Not available  S&P indicative loss severity 37%  
Financing of fees  Prohibited  Prohibits financing of points and fees in 
excess of 6% of the original principal 
balance less points and fees or $1,000, 
whichever is greater. 
Prohibits financing of points and fees in 
excess of 6% of the loan amount. 
Prohibits the financing of points and 
fees in excess of 4% of the total loan 
amount if the loan is >=$16,000, or 
$800 if the loan is <$16,000. 
Mandatory arbitration 
limiting judicial relief 
Prohibited No  provision  No provision  Prohibited 
Financing of credit life, 
disability, 
unemployment, or other 
life or health insurance 
premiums (except 
monthly premium) 
Prohibits financing of single premium 
credit insurance and cancellation 
agreements. 
Prohibits financing of single premium 
credit insurance. 
Prohibits the financing of single 
premium credit life, credit disability, 
credit unemployment, or any other life 
or health insurance. 
Prohibits the financing of single 
premium credit life, credit disability, 
credit unemployment, or any other life 
or health insurance, directly or 
indirectly into one or more loans. 
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   Colorado  Connecticut  Cook County, IL  Florida 
Bill's title  HB 1259  HB 6131  Cook County Predatory Lending 
Ordinance 
SB 2262 
Effective  date  1/1/2003 10/1/2001 6/17/2001 10/2/2002 
Coverage  Like HOEPA  "High-cost home loan" means any loan 
or extension of credit, including an 
open-end line of credit but excluding a 
reverse mortgage transaction. Its 
threshold is reached by the APR 
trigger. 
Apply to loans secured by residential 
real property. Does not include loans 
with total loan amount over $250,000. 
Like HOEPA 
APR trigger (HOEPA: 
APR>T-bill + 8% for first 
lien; + 10% for second 
lien) *  
Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA  APR > T-bill + 6% (first lien) or 8% 
(second lien) 
Like HOEPA 
Points and fees trigger 
(HOEPA: P&F> greater 
of 8% of total loan 
amount or $499 (for 
2004) - the set dollar 
amount is adjusted 
annually according to 
CPI) 
P&F > 6% of the total loan amount  Prepaid finance charges cannot 
exceed the greater of 5% of the 
principal amount or $2,000. 
P&F > (1) 5% of the total loan mount if 
amount >=$16,000, or (2) $800 if loan 
amount < $16,000. 
Like HOEPA 
Points and fees 
definition 
Not mentioned  "Prepaid finance charge" includes loan 
fees, points, commissions, broker's 
fees or commissions, transaction fees 
or similar finance charges, any fees or 
commissions payable to the lender or 
broker in connection with the sale of 
credit life, accident, health, disability or 
unemployment insurance products or 
unrelated goods or services. 
Include, among others, all 
compensation paid directly or indirectly 
to a mortgage broker, the premium of 
any single premium credit life, credit 
disability, credit unemployment, or any 
other life or health insurance. Shall not 
include taxes, filing fees, charges paid 
to public officials or government 
agency, bona fide and reasonable fees 
paid to third party. 
Not mentioned 
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   Colorado  Connecticut  Cook County, IL  Florida 
Prepayment penalties  Prepayment fees are permitted only 
during the first 36 months after 
consummation. Prepayment fees and 
penalties should not exceed 6 months’ 
interest for prepayment within the first 3 
years. No prepayment fees or penalties 
can be charged for prepayment: (1) 
after the 3rd year of the loan; (2) 
pursuant to a refinance by the same 
lender; or (3) that is partial. 
Prepayment fees may not be included 
in a covered loan UNLESS the lender 
offers the obligor the option of choosing 
a loan product without a prepayment 
fee. 
Penalty cannot > 3% of prepaid 
balance within one year; 2% between 
one and two years, and 1% between 
two and three years. Prepayment 
penalty not allowed if debts >/= 50% of 
monthly gross income. The payment of 
the prepayment penalty cannnot be 
through a refinancing by the lender or 
its affiliate (no wrapping of fees into the 
new loan amount). 
Prohibits prepayment penalities (1) that 
apply to a prepayment made after the 
expiration of 36-month period following 
the date the loan was made, or (2) that 
are more than 3% total loan amount 
(first 12 months) or 2% (second 12 
months) or 1% (third 12 month period).  
Prepayment penalties are permitted 
only during the first 36 months after 
consummation, if (1) the borrower has 
been offered a choice of another 
product without a prepayment penalty, 
and (2) the borrower has been given at 
least 3 business days prior to 
consummation a written disclosure with 
terms and the benefit of accepting a 
loan with prepayment penalty. 
Loan counseling  No lending without cautionary notice.  No lending without cautionary notice.  No provision  No provision 
Ability to repay  No lending without due regard to ability 
to pay. Violation is presumed if the 
creditor engages in a pattern or 
practice of making loans without 
verifying and documenting consumers’ 
repayment ability. The lender may 
consider stated income. 
No lending without due regard to ability 
to pay.  
Monthly debts should not exceed 50% 
gross income. Applies to borrowers 
whose income is no greater than 120% 
of the Chicago MSA median family 
income. 
No lending without due regard to ability 
to pay 
Balloon payments  No balloons payable less than 120 
months or 10 years after 
consummation. 
No balloons for a loan with a term of 
less than 7 years (does not apply to 
bridge loans with maturities of less than 
1 year, and a loan connected with the 
acquisition or construction of a 
dwelling). 
No balloons payable less than 180 
months after consummation. 
Balloon payments for a loan with a term 
of less than 10 years prohibited. 
Assignee liability  S&P indicative loss severity 119%   Not Available at this time  Not available  S&P indicative loss severity 119% 
(HCL) 
Financing of fees  No provision No  provision Prohibits  financing of points and fees in 
excess of 6% of the loan amount. 
No provision 
Mandatory arbitration 
limiting judicial relief 
No mandatory arbitration, unless the 
clause complies with rules set forth by 
AAA. 
No mandatory arbitration or a waiver of 
participation in a class action. 
No provision  No provision 
Financing of credit life, 
disability, 
unemployment, or other 
life or health insurance 
premiums (except 
monthly premium) 
No financing of credit insurance.  No offering single premium credit 
insurance without also offering it on a 
monthly basis, and the right to cancel. 
Prohibits the financing of single 
premium credit life, credit disability, 
credit unemployment, or any other life 
or health insurance. 
No provision 
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   Georgia  Illinois  Indiana  Kentucky 
Bill's title  HB 1361 as amended by SB 53  SB 1784  HB 1229 (Public law 73)  HB 287 
Effective date  Pre-amendment: 10/1/2002; Post-
amendment: 3/7/2003 
1/1/2004 3/24/2004 6/24/2003 
Coverage  A high-cost home loan includes an 
open-end credit plan but not a reverse 
mortgage. 
A high risk home loan is a home equity 
loan (i.e. not a purchase money loan) 
other than an open-end loan. 
"Home equity loan" means any loan 
secured by the borrower's primary 
residence where the proceeds are not 
used as purchase money for the 
residence. 
A high-cost home loan is a home loan 
excluding an open-end credit plan and 
a reverse mortgage. 
A high-cost home loan includes a loan 
other than an open-end credit plan or a 
reverse 
mortgage, where the principal amount 
of the loan is greater than $15,000 and 
does not exceed $200,000. 
APR trigger (HOEPA: 
APR>T-bill + 8% for first 
lien; + 10% for second 
lien) *  
Covered loan: APR> higher of 4% 
(5.5% for second lien) above prime rate 
or 2% (3% for second lien) above 90-
day standard delivery commitment with 
comparable term. 
HCL: Like HOEPA. ‘net benefit to 
borrower’ protection kicks in on first 
liens at higher of Fannie/Freddie plus 
2% or prime plus 4%, on second liens 
at higher of Fannie/Freddie plus 3% or 
prime plus 5.5%   
APR > T-bill + 6% for first lien; + 8% for 
junior lien 
Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA 
Points and fees trigger 
(HOEPA: P&F> greater 
of 8% of total loan 
amount or $499 (for 
2004) - the set dollar 
amount is adjusted 
annually according to 
CPI) 
Covered loan: P&F>3% of total loan 
amount. 
HCL: P&F > 5% of the total loan 
amount for loans =/> $20,000, or the 
lesser of 8% of the total loan amount or 
$1,000 for loans <$20,000) (up to two 
bona fide discount points may be 
excluded). 
P&F > the greater of 5% of the total 
loan amount or $800 (to be adjusted 
annually) 
P&F>5% of the loan principal for loans 
>=$40,000; or 6% of the loan principal 
for loans <=$40,000 
Like HOEPA 
Points and fees 
definition 
It includes, among others, all 
compensation paid directly or indirectly 
to a mortgage broker (includes YSPs); 
premiums for credit life, credit accident, 
credit health, loss of income, debt 
cancellation etc.; the maximum 
prepayment penalties which may be 
charged or collected under the terms of 
the loan document; all prepayment fees 
or penalties that are charged if the loan
refinances a previous loan made or 
currently held by the same creditor of 
its affiliate. Excludable: 2 BFDs if loan 
rate is within 1% of 90-day 
Fannie/Freddie rate. 
It includes, among others, all 
compensation paid directly or indirectly 
to a mortgage broker; premiums for 
credit life, credit disability, credit 
unemployment, or any other 
live or health insurance that is financed 
directly or indirectly into the loan. 
It includes, among others, all 
compensation paid directly or indirectly 
to a mortgage broker. Excludable: 
BFDs; up to 1.5 points in indirect broker 
compensation, if the terms of the loan 
do not include PP>2% of the home 
loan principal; reasonable fees paid to 
an affiliate of the creditor. 
Not mentioned or found in the bill 
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   Georgia  Illinois  Indiana  Kentucky 
Prepayment penalties  No prepayment penalties after the 
last day of the 24th month following 
the loan closing or at any time if 
prepayment penalties exceed in 
the aggregate: (1) during the first 
12 months, more than 2% of the 
loan amount prepaid, or (2) during 
the second 12 months, more than 
1% of the loan amount prepaid. 
No prepayment penalties after the 
first 36 months. Prepayment 
penalty cannot exceed  3% of the 
total loan amount if the prepayment 
is made within the first 12 months; 
2% within the second 12 months; 
and 1% within the third 12 months. 
Prohibits prepayment penalty 
exceeding 2% of the HCL amount 
prepaid during the first 24 months 
after closing. No prepayment 
penalty after the 2nd year. No 
prepayment penalty without an 
option of choosing a loan product 
without a prepayment penalty 
(must include "loan product choice" 
disclosure) 
Prepayment penalty prohibited if 
charged more than 36 months after 
the loan closing or which exceeds 
3% of the amount prepaid during 
the first year, 2% during the 
second year, and 1% during the 
third year. 
Loan counseling  Required. Lender must receive a 
certification that borrower received 
counseling, and special disclosure 
notice must be provided to 
borrower. 
Prohibits lending without a 
counseling notice and disclosure. 
Required  Prohibits lending without making 
available to the borrower an 
educational video approved by the 
Department of Financial 
Institutions. 
Ability to repay  Total monthly debt payments do 
not exceed 50% of monthly gross 
income. 
Prohibits lending without regard to 
repayment ability.  
Prohibits lending without due 
regard to repayment ability. 
Prohibits lending without regard to 
repayment ability.  
Balloon payments  Prohibited  No balloon payments for loans 
under 15 years. 
No balloon payment within 10 
years 
Prohibited 
Assignee liability  Assignee is liable for all claims and 
defenses related to a home loan   
S&P indicative loss severity 110% 
(post amendment March 2003) 
S&P indicative loss severity 110%  Not available  S&P indicative loss severity 275% 
Financing of fees  No provision  No financing of points and fees in 
excess of 6% of the total loan 
amount. 
Prohibits financing of points and 
fees. 
No financing of any prepayment 
fees or penalties and points and 
fees (some are excluded) in 
excess of 4% of the total amount 
financed, if the proceeds of the 
high-cost home loan are used to 
refinance an existing high-cost 
home loan held by the same 
lender. 
Mandatory arbitration 
limiting judicial relief 
Prohibited Prohibits  "mandatory arbitration 
provision that is oppressive, unfair, 
or substantially in derogation of the 
rights of the borrower." 
Prohibits mandatory arbitration  Prohibited unless the clause 
complies with rules set forth by 
AAA. 
Financing of credit 
life, disability, 
unemployment, or 




Applies to any home loan: No 
financing of various insurance 
payments and payments for debt 
cancellation agreements that 
provide for cancellation of 
borrower's liability. 
Prohibits financing of single 
premium credit insurance. 
Prohibits financing of any life or 
health insurance 
Prohibits financing of single 
premium credit insurance. 
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   Maine  Maryland  Massachusetts  Nevada 
Bill's title  LD 494 (Public law 49)  HB 649  Chapter 268 of 2004 and Regulation 
209 CMR 53.00 
AB 284 (chapter 465 of 2003) 
Effective  date  4/17/2003 5/16/2002 3/22/2001 10/1/2003 
Coverage  A high rate, high fee mortgage's 
threshold is reached by either the APR 
trigger or the P&F trigger 
A covered loan's threshold is reached 
by either the APR trigger or the points 
& fees trigger. 
A high-cost home mortgage loan is 
consumer credit transaction secured by 
the borrower’s principal dwelling, 
excluding a reverse mortgage. Its 
threshold is reached by either the APR 
trigger or the P&F trigger. 
A home loan's threshold is reached by 
either the APR trigger or the P&F 
trigger. 
APR trigger (HOEPA: 
APR>T-bill + 8% for first 
lien; + 10% for second 
lien) *  
Like HOEPA  APR > T-bill + 7% (first lien) or 9% 
(junior lien) 
APR>T-bill+8% (1st lien); +9% (2nd 
lien) 
Like HOEPA 
Points and fees trigger 
(HOEPA: P&F> greater 
of 8% of total loan 
amount or $499 (for 
2004) - the set dollar 
amount is adjusted 
annually according to 
CPI) 
Like HOEPA  P&F > 7% of the total loan mount or 
$499 (for 2004) 
P&F>max(5% total loan amount; 
$400(adjusted annually)) 
Like HOEPA 
Points and fees 
definition 
Not mentioned  Not mentioned  Includes, among others,  all 
prepayment penalties incurred in a refi 
by the same lender, all compensation 
paid directly or indirectly to a mortgage 
broker, the cost of all premiums 
financed directly or indirectly by the 
creditor for SPCI. Excludable: either a 
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   Maine  Maryland  Massachusetts  Nevada 
Prepayment penalties  No provision No  provision Prohinited  after 36 months from the 
date of the note. Otherwise, the penalty 
shall be the balance of the first year's 
interest or 3 months interest (whichever 
is less). If prepayment is due to 
refinancing of a loan in another 
financial institution, an additional 
payment up to 3 months interest may 
be required. 
Prohibits financing of a prepayment fee 
or penalty in connection with a 
refinancing. 
Loan counseling  No provision  Prohibits lending without providing the 
borrower with a written 
recommendation that the borrower 
seek home buyer education or housing 
counseling 
Prohibits lending without home 
ownership counseling. 
No provision 
Ability to repay  No provision  Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability (does not apply if the 
borrower's gross monthly income 
exceeds 120% of the median family 
income) 
Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability. 
Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability. 
Balloon payments  No provision  No provision Prohibited  No  provision 
Assignee liability  Not available  Not available  S&P indicative loss severity 116%   S&P indicative loss severity 268%  
Financing of fees  No points and fees may be charged 
during refinancing of an existing high 
rate, high fee mortgage owned by the 
same creditor and the last financing 
was within 18 months of the current 
refinancing. 
No provision  Prohibits financing of points and fees in 
excess of the greater of 5% of the total 
loan amount of $800. 
No provision 
Mandatory arbitration 
limiting judicial relief 
No provision  No provision Prohibited  No  provision 
Financing of credit life, 
disability, 
unemployment, or other 
life or health insurance 
premiums (except 
monthly premium) 
Prohibits selling of single premium 
credit insurance without also offering its 
sale on a monthly basis. 
Prohibits the financing of single 
premium credit insurance. Also, the 
lender cannot require a borrower to 
purchase property insurance coverage 
against risk to any improvement in an 
amount exceeding the replacement 
value of improvements. 
Prohibits financing of single premium 
credit insurance (applies to a home 
mortgage loan). 
Prohibits financing of credit insurance 
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   New Jersey  New Mexico  New York  North Carolina 
Bill's title  AB 75  SB 449  AB 11856  HB 1149 as amended by HB 1182 (Oct 1, 
2003) 
Effective  date  11/27/2003 1/1/2004 4/1/2003  7/21/2000  (HCL);  10/1/1999  (consumer 
home loans) 
Coverage  A high-cost home loan includes an 
open-end credit plan but not a reverse 
mortgage, in which the principal 
amount of the loan does not exceed 
$350,000 (adjusted annually). 
A high-cost home loan includes an 
open-end credit plan but not a reverse 
mortgage or a bridge loan. 
A high-cost home loan includes an 
open-end credit plan but not a reverse 
mortgage, in 
which the principal amount does not 
exceed the lesser of: (1) conforming 
loan size limit for a comparable 
dwelling as established by Fannie 
Mae, or (2) $300,000. 
HIGH-COST HOME LOANS, including 
open-end lines of credit transactions but 
excluding reverse mortgages, where 
principal amount (or the borrower's initial 
maximum credit limit - in case of open-end 
lines of credit) does not exceed lesser of: 
(1) conforming loan size limit for single-
family dwelling as established by Fannie 
Mae, or (2) $300,000. 
Note: HB1149 excluded open-end lines of 
credit (as well as reverse mortgage) from 
the definition of HCL. 
APR trigger (HOEPA: 
APR>T-bill + 8% for first 
lien; + 10% for second 
lien) *  
Like HOEPA  INTEREST RATE > T-bill + 7% for first 
lien; T-bill + 9% for subordinate lien 
APR > T-bill +8% for a first lien and 
+9% for a second lien 
Like HOEPA 
Points and fees trigger 
(HOEPA: P&F> greater 
of 8% of total loan 
amount or $499 (for 
2004) - the set dollar 
amount is adjusted 
annually according to 
CPI) 
P&F > 4.5% of the total loan amount 
for 
loans =/> $40,000, the lesser of 6% of 
the total loan amount or $1,000 for 
loans <$20,000, and 6% of the total 
loan amount for loans =/>$20,000 but 
<$40,000 
P&F > 5% of the principal loan amount 
for loans =/> $20,000; the lesser of 
$1,000 or 8% of the principal loan 
amount for loans < $20,000 
P&F > 5% of total loan amount for 
loans in the amount of $50,000 or 
more; 6% of total loan amount for 
loans in the amount of $50,000 that are 
purchase-money loans guaranteed by 
FHA or VA; or the greater of 6% of 
total loan amount or $1,500 for loans 
up to $50,000. 
P&F> 5% of total loan amount if loan =/> 
$20,000; or lesser of 8% of total loan 
amount of $1,000 if loan < $20,000. 
Certain items may be excluded from the 
calculation of P&F. 
Points and fees 
definition 
It includes, all compensation paid 
directly or indirectly to a mortgage 
broker; premiums financed directly or 
indirectly for credit or other insurance 
or suspension agreement (expect paid 
on a monthly basis); max. prepayment 
fees and penalties that may be 
charged; all prepayment fees or 
penalties that are incurred by the 
borrower if the loan refinances a 
previous loan made or currently held 
by the same creditor or its affiliate 
(does not apply to a loan refinancing a 
previous loan made by the same 
broker and funded by another creditor). 
Excludable: either a conventional 
prepayment penalty or up to 2 BFDs in 
fact reducing IR by more than 2% for a 
first lien or 3.5% for a junior lien. 
It includes, all compensation paid 
directly or indirectly to a mortgage 
broker; premiums financed directly or 
indirectly for credit or other insurance 
or suspension agreement (expect paid 
on a monthly basis); max.  prepay fees 
and penalties that may be charged; all 
prepayment fees or penalties that are 
incurred by the borrower if the loan 
refinances a previous loan made or 
currently held by the same creditor or 
its affiliate. Excludable: the sum of the 
conventional prepayment penalties and 
BFDs in fact reducing APR from APR 
that does not exceed the conventional 
mortgage rate by more than 1.5% for a 
first lien or 3% for a junior lien. If the 
sum exceeds 2 points, only the amount 
representing 2 points is excluded. 
It includes, among others, all 
compensation paid directly or indirectly 
to a mortgage broker (e.g. YSPs); 
premiums financed directly or indirectly 
for credit or other insurance or 
suspension agreement (expect 
premiums paid on a monthly basis). 
Excludable: 2 BFDs reducing the 
interest rate by 25 basis points or ¼ 
point, but only if within 1%of the T-bill 
rate. 
Compensation paid directly by borrower to 
mortgage broker, cost of all premiums for 
credit and other insurance financed by 
lender, maximum prepayment penalties 
allowed under loan document, finance 
charges except interest or the time-price 
differential, certain real estate related fees. 
Excludable: 2 BFDs if the loan rate is within 
1% of 90-day Fannie/Freddie rate; 1 BFD if 
within 2%. 
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   New Jersey  New Mexico  New York  North Carolina 
Prepayment penalties  There used to be a "prepayment 
penalty trigger" (after 30 months or 
>2% amount prepaid) in the old bill but 
was either removed or not passed. 
"Conventional prepayment penalty" 
may be charged under some 
conditions, but not clear what 
"conventional" means. 
Prohibited Prohibits  financing of points and fees 
(and prepayment fees or penalties) 
when the current HCL is refinanced by 
the same creditor or its affiliate’s HCL. 
Prohibited on all loans below $150,000 
(not only high-cost loans).  
Loan counseling  Required. Certification received;  
special cautionary notice . 
Required Required Required 
Ability to repay  Presumption borrower can repay if his 
total monthly debts do not exceed 50% 
of his monthly gross income. 
No provision  Presumption borrower can repay if his 
total monthly debts do not exceed 50% 
of his monthly gross income, and 
lender followed residual income 
guidelines. 
Total monthly debt payments do not 
exceed 50% of monthly gross income. 
Balloon payments  Prohibited  Prohibited  Prohibits balloon payments during the 
first 15 years after origination. 
Prohibited 
Assignee liability  S&P indicative loss severity 196% 
(home loan, covered home loan), 110% 
(refinancings only) 
S&P indicative loss severity 110% 
(HCL) 
S&P indicative loss severity 163%  S&P indicative loss severity 275%. 
Financing of fees  Financing of points and fees in amount 
> 2% of the total loan amount is 
prohibited. 
Prohibits financing of points and fees in 
excess of 2% of the principal loan 
amount. 
No financing of points and fees in 
amount > 3% of the principal amount of 
the loan (or, for refinancings, 3% of the 
additional proceeds received by the 
borrower in connection with the 
refinancing).  No financing of points 
and fees (and prepayment fees or 
penalties) when the current HCL is 
refinanced by the same creditor or its 
affiliate’s HCL. 
No financing of points and fees or any 
charges payable to 3rd parties. 
Also, no financing of prepayment fees 
or penalties in a refinancing by the 
same creditor or its affiliate. 
Mandatory arbitration 
limiting judicial relief 
Any provision that allows a party to 
require a borrower to assert any claim 
or defense in a forum that is less 
convenient, more costly, or more 
dilatory for the resolution of a dispute 
than a juridical forum established in this 
State is unconscionable and void. 
Prohibited  Prohibits mandatory arbitration, unless 
the clause complies with rules set forth 
by AAA. 
No provision 
Financing of credit life, 
disability, 
unemployment, or other 
life or health insurance 
premiums (except 
monthly premium) 
Prohibits financing of single premium 
credit insurance. No financing of 
payments for debt cancellation or 
suspension agreements. 
Prohibits financing of single premium 
credit insurance. 
No financing of single premium credit 
insurance, debt cancellation, or 
suspension agreement payments. 
Also, no packing (selling credit life, 
accident and health, disability, or 
unemployment insurance products or 
unrelated goods in conjunction with 
HCL without a borrower’s informed 
consent). 
Prohibits financing of single premium 
credit insurance. (applies to consumer 
home loans) 
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   Ohio  Oklahoma  Pennsylvania  South Carolina 
Bill's title  HB 386  SB 1481 as amended by HB 1574  SB 377  SB 438 (Act No. 42 of 2003) 
Effective date  2/22/2002  1/1/2004  6/21/2001  1/1/2004 
Coverage  A covered loan's threshold is reached 
by either the APR trigger or the points 
& fees trigger. 
A "subsection 10 mortgage" excludes 
an open-end credit plan and a reverse 
mortgage. 
A covered loan's original principal 
balance must be less than $100,000. 
High-cost home loans exclude an 
open-end credit plan or a reverse 
mortgage, in which the principal 
amount does not exceed the 
conforming loan size limit for a 
comparable dwelling as established by 
Fannie Mae. 
APR trigger (HOEPA: 
APR>T-bill + 8% for first 
lien; + 10% for second 
lien) *  
Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA 
Points and fees trigger 
(HOEPA: P&F> greater 
of 8% of total loan 
amount or $499 (for 
2004) - the set dollar 
amount is adjusted 
annually according to 
CPI) 
Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA  P&F>5% of total loan amount for loans 
>= $20,000; min(8% total loan amount; 
$1000) for loans <$20,000, or 3% of 
total loan amount for nonreal estate 
secured manufactured housing 
transaction if the total loan amount is 
>= $20,000. 
Points and fees 
definition 
Like HOEPA  It includes, among others, all 
compensation paid to a mortgage 
broker, premium for credit life, 
accident, health or other insurance or 
debt cancellation coverage. 
Not mentioned  Includes, among others, all 
compensation paid directly or indirectly 
to a mortgage broker, the maximum 
prepayment penalties which may be 
charged or collected under the terms of 
loan documents; premium or other 
charges for credit life, accident and 
other insurance and debt-cancelation 
coverage (doesnot apply to premiums 
paid on a monthly basis). Excludable: 2 
BFDs if loan rate is within 1% of 90-day 
Fannie/Freddie rate; 1BFD if within 2%; 
conventional prepayment penalty. 
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   Ohio  Oklahoma  Pennsylvania  South Carolina 
Prepayment penalties  Prohibited, unless imposed in 
accordance with HOEPA. 
Prepayment penalty allowed if: (1) at 
the time of consummation, a consumer 
is not liable for monthly indebtedness > 
50% of the consumer's monthly gross 
income; (2) the penalty applies to only 
a prepayment made with funds 
obtained by means other than a 
refinancing; (3) the penalty doesnot 
exceed in the aggregate 2% of the loan 
amount prepaid in the first 12 months 
after consummation; or 1% of the loan 
amount prepaid in the second 12 
months after consummation; (4) the 
penalty does not apply after the end of 
the 2-year period following 
consummation; and (5) the penalty is 
not prohibited under other applicable 
law. 
PP allowed within the first 60 months, 
no PP unless the loan product is also 
available without PP; no PP on 
refinancing of covered loans owned by 
the refinancing lender. 
Prohibited if the aggregate sums 
advanced or contemplated <= 
$150,000 (applies to consumer home 
loans) 
Prohibits financing of prepayment fees 
or penalties in a refinancing by the 
same creditor or its affiliate. 
Loan counseling  No provision  No provision  No provision.   Prohibits lending without home 
ownership counseling. 
Ability to repay  Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability. 
Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability. 
Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability. 
Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability. 
Balloon payments  Prohibits balloon payments for loans 
with a term of less than 5 years (does 
not apply to bridge loans with a 
maturity of less than 1 year) 
No balloon payments for loans with a 
term less than 5 years 
No balloon payments unless such 
balloon payment becomes payable not 
less than 120 months after the date of 
the loan 
Prohibited 
Assignee liability  Not available  Not available  Not available  S&P indicative loss severity 196%  
Financing of fees  No provision  No provision  Prohibits charging of points and fees in 
connection with refinancing of covered 
loans. 
Financing of points and fees exceeding 
2.5% of total loan amount is prohibited. 
Mandatory arbitration 
limiting judicial relief 
No provision  Prohibited, unless the clause complies 
with rules set forth under AAA. 
No provision.   No provision 
Financing of credit life, 
disability, 
unemployment, or other 
life or health insurance 
premiums (except 
monthly premium) 
Prohibites financing of single premium 
credit insurance within 30 days. 
Prohibits selling of single premium 
credit insurance, unless insurance on a 
monthly basis is also offered and the 
borrower is provided a special notice. 
Prohibits selling of single premium 
credit insurance, unless insurance on a 
monthly basis is also offered and the 
borrower is provided a special notice. 
Prohibits financing of single premium 
credit insurance (applies to consumer 
home loans) 
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   Texas  Utah  Washington D.C.  Wisconsin 
Bill's title  SB (Chapter 622 of 2001)  HB 160  DC Bill B14-0515  AB 792 
Effective  date  9/1/2001 1/30/2004  01/28/03 4/15/2004 
Coverage  A high-cost home loan is a loan, 
excluding an open-end account or a 
reverse mortgage, but including 
residential mortgage transactions if the 
total loan amount is >= $20,000, in 
which the principal amount does not 
exceed 1/2 of maximum conventional 
loan limit established by Fannie Mae. 
A high-cost mortgage is reached by 
either the APR trigger or the P&F 
trigger 
“Covered loan” means a mortgage 
loan, secured by property located in the 
District (including an open-end line of 
credit, but not including a mortgage 
loan insured or guaranteed by a state 
or local authority, the District of 
Columbia Housing Finance Agency, 
the Federal Housing Administration, or 
the Department of Veteran Affairs, or a 
reverse mortgage transaction) 
A covered loan is a consumer 
transaction excluding an open-end 
credit plan and a reverse mortgage. 
APR trigger (HOEPA: 
APR>T-bill + 8% for first 
lien; + 10% for second 
lien) *  
Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA  APR > T-bill + 6% (first lien) or 7% 
(second lien) 
Like HOEPA 
Points and fees trigger 
(HOEPA: P&F> greater 
of 8% of total loan 
amount or $499 (for 
2004) - the set dollar 
amount is adjusted 
annually according to 
CPI) 
Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA  P&F > 5% of the total loan mount  P&F > 6% of total loan amount 
Points and fees 
definition 
Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA  Like HOEPA  Does not include reasonable fees paid 
to affiliates and nonaffiliates of the 
lender for bona fide services listed in 
12 CFR 226.4c(7) 
Prepayment penalties  Prohibited  Prohibits PP more than 36 months after 
origination. No PP exceeding the total 
amount of interest paid at 80% of the 
immediately preceding 6 scheduled 
payments; no PP if the loan is paid with 
the proceeds of a new loan by the 
same lender or affiliate. If a 
prepayment does not pay the full 
amount owed, PP must be reduced by 
% equal to % of the balance owed 
before the prepayment that remains 
unpaid. 
Prohibited  No PP after 36 months and without the 
option of choosing a loan product 
without a PP. PP may not exceed 60 
days' interest at the contract rate on the 
amount prepaid on fixed rate CLs over 
$25,000 if the borrower prepays more 
than 20% of the original loan amount 
within 36 months. No PP on CLs of 
$25,000 or less and on adjustable 
loans. 
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   Texas  Utah  Washington D.C.  Wisconsin 
Loan counseling  No provision  No provision  A lender shall inform a borrower of his 
or her right to obtain counseling in 
connection with a covered loan. 
No provision 
Ability to repay  Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability. 
No provision  Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability. Applies to borrowers 
whose income is no greater than 120% 
of median family income, where 
median family income is the most 
recent estimate by HUD. 
Prohibits lending without due regard to 
repayment ability. 
Balloon payments  Prohibited after the first 60 months.  No provision  A lender shall not make a covered loan 
that provides for a scheduled payment 
that is more than twice as large as the 
average of earlier scheduled monthly 
payments unless the balloon payment 
becomes due and payable not less 
than 7 years after the date of the loan 
closing. 
Prohibited 
Assignee liability  Not available  Not available  S&P indicative loss severity 137%   Not available 
Financing of fees  No provision  Prohibits financing of points and fees in 
an amount exceeding 8% of the total 
loan amount unless the specific 
disclosures are made no later than 3 
business days prior to consummation. 
If a lender refinances a loan secured by 
the same residential real property to 
the same borrower which was made 18 
months or less before the covered loan 
is made, the same lender shall not 
finance, directly or indirectly, any 
portion of the covered loan's 
origination/discount points and fees or 
other fees payable to the lender or any 
third party in excess of the greatest of 
3% of the new covered loan principal 
amount actually funded, $400, or such 




limiting judicial relief 
No provision  Prohibited unless they comply with the 
Utah Uniform Arbitration Act or the 
Federal AA. 
No oppressive mandatory arbitration 
clause. 
No provision 
Financing of credit life, 
disability, 
unemployment, or other 
life or health insurance 
premiums (except 
monthly premium) 
Prohibits offering single premium credit 
insurance without a special notice 
(applies to home loans) 
Prohibits single premium credit 
insurance, debt cancellations and 
suspension agreements. 
A lender shall not sell any individual or 
group credit life, accident, health, or 
unemployment insurance product on a 
prepaid single premium basis in 
conjunction with a covered loan. 
Prohibits direct or indirect financing of 
single premium credit insurance 
products 
*Notes: APR is compared to the yield on Treasury securities with comparable periods of maturity to the loan term. For comparison purposes, the lender must 
reference yields from the Federal Reserve's H.15 release as of the 15th day of the month immediately preceding the month in which the application is received. 
Kansas also has a law (SB 301, Chapter 107 of 1999), which became effective on 4/14/1999.  Due to difficulties including the law in the current framework It is not 
included in the chart.  *Sources: http://www.butera-andrews.com/state-local/b-index.htm; http://www.mbaa.org/resources/predlend/; Standard & Poor’s Anti-
predatory lending update (20 Sept, 2004).  *Italics indicate that the provisions were difficult to ascertain.
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Appendix B: City and County Predatory Lending Bills 
City  Bill title  Status 
Atlanta, GA  Predatory Lending 
Ordinance 
Approved September 2001 
Enjoined from enforcing November 2001 
Baltimore, MD     Known to have once proposed predatory 
lending ordinance. Current status unknown. 
Chicago, IL  Predatory Lending 
Ordinance  Passed Aug 30, 2000 
Cleveland 
Heights, OH  Ordinance 72-2003  Passed June 2, 2003 
Cleveland, OH  Ordinance 737-02 
Passed April 23, 2002 
Effective July 29, 2002  
Note: ordinance passed after state already 
passed preemption law, and upheld by court.  
Revised ordinance 45-03 effective Jan 15, 
2003 
Cook County, IL  Cook County Predatory 
Lending Ordinance 
Passed April 17, 2001 
Effective 60 days after 
Dayton, OH  Ordinance 29990-01 
Passed July 11, 2001 
Challenged by law suit. 





Passed June 2001 
Ruled unconstitutional November 2001. 
Denver, CO     Known to have once proposed predatory 
lending ordinance. Current status unknown. 
Detroit, MI     Passed December 2002 
Vetoed January 2003 
Los Angeles, CA  Ordinance 01-1476 
Passed Nov 22, 2002 
Final approval Dec 2002 
Pending due to unspecified legal dispute. 
NYC, NY  IN67-A 
Passed Sept 25, 2002 
Vetoed by mayor. 
Veto overridden Nov 20, 2002. 
Preempted by state and federal law Jan 2004. 
Oakland, CA  Ordinance 12361 
Passed Oct 2, 2001 
Challenge by American Financial Services 
Association (AFSA) law suit Oct 15, 200.1 
Upheld by court June 2002. 
Appealed by AFSA, pending Supreme Court 
decision. 
Philadelphia, PA  Bill 715  Passed April 2001 
Preempted by state law June 2001. 
Pittsburgh, PA  Ordinance 1676  Current status unknown 
Sacramento, CA    
Proposed August 2001 
Current status unknown, some sources say 
the controversial ordinance was altered into 
an education program against predatory 
lending. 
Toledo, OH  Ordinance 271-03 
Originally, ordinance 291-02 was passed 
November 5, 2002, then held up by court 
stays. 
Ord 271-03 (revision of 291-02) was passed 
July 22, 2003. 
Stayed due to pending law suit by AFSA. 
Washington DC  Predatory Lending bill 
First passed in April 2001 and were to go into 
effect in June 2001. 
Then underwent 4-month suspension. 
Seems to have eventually passed in 2002  
Appendix C: Laws that Apply to the Prime and Subprime Mortgage Market  
   Idaho  Michigan  Minnesota  Mississippi  
Bill's title   S.B. 1389  H.B. 6121  S.F. 2988  H.B. 1522 as amended by H.B. 788 
Effective date   July 1, 2004.  December 23, 2002.  January 1, 2003.   H.B. 1522 on July 1, 2002 and amended on April 
20, 2004. 
Triggers  No provision.  No provision.  No provision.  No provision. 
Prohibited Practices 
-- General 
Applicable to mortgage 
brokers, mortgage lenders, 
and loan originators: 
Accepting fees at closing 
which were not previously 
disclosed. Obtaining any 
agreement in which blanks 
are left to be filled in after 
signing by a borrower. 
Engaging in any 
misrepresentation in 
connection with a 
residential mortgage loan. 
Making any payment to 
influence the independent 
judgment of the appraiser. 
Charging a fee for a product or service 
not actually provided. Misrepresenting 
the amount charged by or paid to a 3rd 
party for a product or service. Making 
false, deceptive, or misleading 
statements or representations. 
Changing or inserting information on a 
loan application that is false and 
misleading and intended to deceive a 
3rd party that the borrower is qualified 
for the loan. Conditioning the payment 
of an appraisal upon a predetermined 
value or the closing of the loan. 
Compensating, coercing, or intimidating 
an appraiser for the purpose of 
influencing the appraiser's independent 
judgment. Executing a mortgage loan 
note which contains blanks to be filled 
in after the note is signed by the 
borrower. 
No provision. 
Misrepresenting material facts, concealing material 
facts, and making false promises. Failure to disburse 
funds in accordance with a contract. Refusal to issue 
a satisfaction of a mortgage loan. Failure to account 
for or deliver any personal property (e.g. deposits, 
mortgages, etc.) that is not the property of the 
mortgage company. Engaging in any transaction 
that is not in good faith. Engaging in any fraudulent 
residential mortgage underwriting practices. 
Inducing, requiring, or permitting the applicant for a 
mortgage loan to sign documents with blank spaces 
to be filled in afterwards. Making any residential 
mortgage loan with the intent to foreclose on the 
borrower's property. Paying any person not licensed 
(or not exempt) any commission or bonus in 
connection with arranging for or originating a 
mortgage loan. Refusing to provide the loan payoff 
within 3 business days. 
Prohibited Practices 
--Prepay Penalties 
No provision.  No provision. 
No pp for any partial 
prepayment; no pp for any 
prepayment of the 
residential mortgage loan 
upon the sale of any 
residential real property or 
interest thereof; no pp for 
prepayment more than 42 
months after the date of 
the note; no pp which 
exceeds the lesser of 2% 
of the unpaid principal 
balance or an amount 
equal to 60 days’ interest 
(otherwise disclosure is 
required – must be read 
twice and the borrower 
must be provided a copy). 
No provision. 
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     Idaho  Michigan  Minnesota  Mississippi  
Prohibited Practices 
-- Points and Fees 
No provision.  No provision. 
No financing of interests, 
points, finance charges, 
fees and other charges in 
excess of 5% of the loan 
amount. Prepayment 
penalty. 
Charging or collecting any fee from a borrower 
unless a loan is actually found, obtained, and 
closed, and in no event in excess of 7.95% of the 
original principal amount (must be also included in 
the APR calculations). 
Prohibited Practices 
-- Balloon Payments  No provision. 
Balloon payments for loans with a term 
of less than 5 years (does not apply to 
bridge loans with maturities of less than 
1 year). 
No provision.  No provision. 
Prohibited Practices 
-- Insurance  No provision.  Financing of single premium credit 
insurance.  No provision.  No provision. 
Prohibited Practices 
-- Counseling and 
Education  No provision. 
Lending without providing the borrower 
with "Borrowers Bill of Rights."  Lending 
without providing the borrower with 
"Consumer Caution and Home 
Ownership Counseling Notice." 
No provision.  No provision. 
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   New 
Hampshire  
Tennessee   Washington   West Virginia  
Bill's title 
S.B. 99  S.B. 3455 
H.B. 1205 as amended by H.B. 6338 
and H.B. 1150  S.B. 418 as amended by H.B. 4379 
Effective date   January 1, 
2005   January 1, 2005  2001 and last amended on April 15, 
2003.   S.B. 418 on July, 2001 and amended in February 4, 2002. 







Making false written promises 
intended to and likely to influence, 
persuade, or induce a person to 
enter in a mortgage loan. 
Substantially misrepresenting, 
circumventing, or concealing any of 
the material particulars or the nature 
thereof, regarding a mortgage 
transaction to which such person is a 
party. Failure to disburse funds in 
accordance with a written agreement. 
Failure to account for or deliver any 
personal property (e.g. deposits, 
mortgages, etc.) that is not the 
property of the licensee. Obtaining 
any agreement or instrument with 
blank spaces to be filled in 
afterwards. Attempting to intimidate a 
real estate appraiser or influence an 
appraiser's report relating to market 
conditions or determination of value. 
Schemes to defraud or mislead a 
lender or any person. Unfair and 
deceptive practices. Obtaining 
property by fraud or 
misrepresentation. Advertisement of 
specific interest rates unless they are 
actually available. Making any 
payment, directly or indirectly, to any 
appraiser for the purposes of 
influencing the independent judgment 
of the appraiser with respect to the 
value of the property. Noncompliance 
with TILA, Regulation Z, RESPA, 
Regulation X, the EqualCredit 
Opportunity Act, or Regulation B in 
any advertising of residential 
mortgage loans or any other 
consumer loan company activity. 
 
Any provision whereby the borrower waives any rights under 
this article.  Requirement that more than one installment be 
payable in any one installment period (i.e. advance 
payments), or that the amount of any installment be greater 
or less than any other installment (i.e. balloon payments), 
except: the final installment may be in a lesser amount. 
Assignment of wages. Compulsory arbitration which does 
not comply with federal law. Blanks to be filled in after the 
consummation of the loan. Coercing or intimidating an 
appraiser for the purpose of influencing his independent 
judgment. Acceleration because of a decrease in the market 
value of the residential dwelling securing the loan. Requiring 
terms of repayment which do not result in continuous 
monthly reduction of the original principal amount (i.e. 
negative amortization). Making a loan that, when added to 
the aggregate total of all outstanding loans secured by the 
same property, exceed the fair market value of the property. 
Recommendation of default. Lending without a specific 
disclosure.  Collecting a fee that (1) is undisclosed to the 
borrower; (2) is for services not actually provided; (3) 
misrepresents the amount paid to a 3rd party; or (4) is a 
duplicate fee for acting a both broker and lender for the 
same loan. 
Prohibited Practices 
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   New 
Hampshire  
Tennessee   Washington   West Virginia  
Prohibited Practices 
-- Points and Fees 
No provision. 
Accepting any fees at 
closing which were not 
disclosed. Engaging in a 
pattern of consistently 
and materially 
underestimating the 
closing costs. Delaying 
closing any mortgage 
loan for the purpose of 
increasing interest, 
costs, fees, or charges 
payable by the borrower. 
Making of false or deceptive 
statements with regard to the rates, 
points, or other financing terms or 
conditions. 
Points and fees in excess of 6% of the loan amount financed 
(including YSP but excluding reasonable closing costs). If no YSP is 
charged, points and fees cannot exceed 5% of the loan amount 
financed. YSP for any loan with APR > 18% of the unpaid balance of 
the amount financed. The maximum rate of finance charges on or in 
connection with any subordinate mortgage loan exceeding 18% on the 
unpaid balance of the amount financed.  Additional charges unless the 
loan is made.  Imposing additional origination fees, investigation fees, 
or points and fees in any refinancing within 24 months, unless the new 
loan has a reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower (must be 
documented in the loan file). Late charges made less than 10 days 
after the regularly scheduled due date. Charging an application fee 
unless the mortgage is consummated (reimbursement for actual 
expenses may be required in a purchase money transaction if: (1) the 
borrower willfully fails to close the loan; or (2) the borrower falsely or 
fraudulently represents a material fact which prevents closing of the 
loan as proposed).  Charging for services before their completion.  
Prohibited Practices 
-- Balloon Payments  No provision.  No provision.  No provision.  No provision. 
Prohibited Practices 
-- Insurance 
No provision.  No provision. 
Issuing or selling of a single premium 
credit insurance (does not apply to 
loans with the loan amount </= 
$10,000, with the repayment term of 
less than 5 year, or if the term of 
insurance does not exceed the 
repayment term of the loan), unless 
(1) its term is the same as the term of 
the loan; (2) the debtor is given the 
option of buying credit insurance with 
monthly premiums; and (3) the policy 
provides for a full refund of  
premiums if the credit insurance is 
cancelled within 60 days of the date 
of the loan. 
Hazard insurance exceeding the standard rate approved by the 
insurance commissioner. 
Prohibited Practices 
-- Other Disclosures 
and Requirements 
No provision.  No provision. 
Lending without an itemized 
estimation and explanation of all fees 
and costs, APR, and whether the 
loan contains a prepayment penalty 
provided within 3 business days 
following receipt of a loan application. 
No provision. 
Source: http://www.butera-andrews.com/state-local/b-index.htm.  Oregon (in effect January 1, 2006) and Nebraska (in effect March 1, 
2004) also have laws in effect, but details on those laws are not yet available. 
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